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Abstract
This study investigates benchmark beating behaviour and circumstances under which managers
inflate earnings to beat earnings benchmarks. We show that two benchmarks, positive earnings
and positive earnings change, are associated with earnings manipulation. Using a sample of
Australian firms from 2000 to 2006, we find that when the underlying earnings are negative or
below prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings
to beat benchmarks.
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Introduction
The issue of benchmarks in the context of earnings manipulation is a much investigated issue in
accounting literature3. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) investigate earnings management
behaviour of firms and link it to earnings benchmarks: profits and earnings increase. Using
distribution of earnings, they postulate that discontinuities around zero earnings and zero
changes in earnings to be evidences of managers manipulating earnings to report profits and to
sustain last year’s earnings. Later studies of managers engaging in earnings management to meet
or beat earnings targets have replicated this methodology of examining distribution of earnings
with mixed results, casting doubts on validity of using distributions method to ascertain earnings
management behaviour.
In addition to the mixed results shown by using the distribution of earnings, whether
benchmark beating is caused by earnings manipulation remains an unresolved issue for at least
two reasons. First, the assertion of causality between earnings management and benchmarks is
based on ex post reported earnings. However, real managerial effort to meet benchmarks that
results in improved firm performance cannot be distinguished from apparent earnings
manipulation by examining reported earnings, especially for firms that are on the margins of
benchmarks (Dechow, Richardson & Tuna 2003). Second, although earnings discontinuities are
observable, the distribution of “normal earnings level” in the absence of managerial
manipulation is not defined (Kerstein & Rai 2007). In fact, managerial discretion to beat earnings
targets, in part at least, is conditional on the nature of true earnings, that is, pre-managed
earnings. For example, managers may increase earnings to reach targets when pre-managed
earnings are below benchmarks. Managers can also decrease earnings when pre-managed
earnings are well above benchmarks in order to save some income to beat benchmarks in the
future (known as income smoothing or ‘cookie jar accounting’) or when pre-managed earnings
are at a level so far below target that management discretion or effort is insufficient to reach it so
that accruals are used to deflate earning (‘big bath accounting’). Besides these two reasons,
econometric and measurement issues of what constitutes earnings manipulation also create
problems in using the earnings discontinuities to establish evidence of earnings management per
se.
In the Australian context, the issue of benchmark beating and its association with
earnings management is also not settled. Holland and Ramsay (2003) examine earnings
distribution at two benchmarks (zero earnings and increase or sustaining last year’s earnings) to
find greater than expected frequency of firms around small profits and small earnings increases,
and fewer than expected small losses and small earnings decreases to draw inferences regarding
earnings manipulations. However, Coulton, Coulton and Taylor (2005) do not find significant
difference between discretionary accruals for the benchmark beating and ‘just-miss’ groups. As
such, they suggest that caution is needed to interpret benchmark beating caused by earnings
management, especially for ‘just-miss’ groups.
Based on this evidence in the Australian context, and the mixed evidence of
benchmark beating in general, we are motivated to examine the behaviour of benchmark beating
further. We extend Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005) by investigating
3

Notable studies among these are: Barua, Elliott and Finn (2006), Coulton et al. (2005), Dechow, Richardson and
Tuna (2000), Dechow et al. (2003), Degeorge, Patell and Zeckhauser (1999), Durtschi and Easton (2005), Holland
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whether managers manipulate earnings to meet or beat the same benchmarks: above-zero
earnings (profits) and earnings increase (sustain prior year’s earnings). However, we differentiate
our research design by conditioning our analysis and results on benchmarks of ‘pre-managed
earnings’. We use pre-managed earnings as a measure of true earnings level of a firm and
postulate that managers engage in earning manipulation only if the earnings are short of
benchmark levels on an ex ante basis. Our focus on the examination of pre-managed earnings, to
the extent that accruals are used on an ex-post basis to adjust earnings, is an ex ante condition
under which firms seek to manipulate earnings. Our research design allows us to condition the
earnings manipulation behaviour, either to increase or decrease earnings when pre-managed
earnings are below or above these benchmarks.
In addition to shedding light on the link between earnings manipulation and
benchmark, we refine the standard Jones model for several alternate measures of accrual
measurement. Operating cash flows (McNichols & Wilson 1988) and relative earnings
performances (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995) are identified to contribute to model
misspecification in estimating discretionary accruals. In our study, we estimate discretionary
accruals by using a variation of the Jones model with the change of operating cash flows as an
additional variable. We employ the performance adjusted technique of Kasznik (1999) to adjust
the effect of industry-wide relative earnings performance.
Our summary of results is as follows. We first find significant discontinuities in the
distribution of reported earnings and changes in earnings. However, these discontinuities
disappear when the earnings are purged of discretionary accruals. We then estimate frequency of
firms achieving earnings targets with the aid of earnings manipulation. The result suggests that a
relatively low level of earnings management takes place among the subset of Australian firms
confronted with reporting earnings decreases and losses compared to that of U.S. Third, we find
when pre-managed earnings are negative or below prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to
exercise positive discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat earnings benchmarks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section is the literature
review and hypothesis development; the third section discusses research design and
methodologies; the fourth describes data and sample selection process; the fifth presents the
empirical results and, the sixth section concludes the paper.
Prior Literature and Hypotheses
In an important study of earnings manipulation, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) state two theories
to provide rationales to avoid reporting earnings losses and decreases. Using transaction cost
theory they suggest that firms who report losses or earnings decrease tend to face higher
transactions costs from the firms’ stakeholders. Further, the prospect theory postulates losses and
gains are valued differently implying that a firm may realise the largest value increase when it
turns an expected loss to a profit. In addition, negative earnings decrease affect firms’ credit
ratings and their cost of capital resulting in loss of firm value and imply further earnings
decreases in future.
The role of benchmarks or targets is important for earnings manipulation. From an
accounting perspective, income smoothing requires that to reduce fluctuation managers may use
accruals to increase or decrease current reported earnings to match pre-determined earnings
target levels. From the managerial incentive perspectives, however, earnings manipulation
behaviour is generally based on the notion that managers are assumed to be wealth-maximisers
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who recognise that their wealth is adversely impacted when their firms’ reported earnings fail to
achieve benchmarks. Balsam (1998) shows evidence that CEO cash compensation is associated
with discretionary accruals and such association varies depending on the circumstance where
positive discretionary accruals are used to achieve earnings benchmarks. Supporting this
conjecture Healy (1985) finds that shareholders increase their monitoring when a firm fails to
meet their benchmarks and Gaver , Gaver and Austin (1995) find managers are punished in the
form of reduced compensation and an increased probability of dismissal. The compensation
committees can also distinguish between the components of earning and reward managers when
their discretionary behaviour achieves the firms’ goals. Ke (2001) links beating profits and last
year’s earnings behaviour with CEOs’ compensation and pointed out that CEO compensation
incentive formed one set of economic determinants of benchmark beating behaviour. Matsunaga
and Park (2001) found that CEO compensation would be reduced when a firm misses an
earnings benchmark because the compensation committee may view this as a signal of poor
management performance. In Australian annual reports, corporate earnings figure is widely used
as a key indicator of business performance. Earnings are one of the first measures highlighted
and most of executive’s review will compare this year’s earnings performance with those of
previous years. Target Based Incentive Plans are the most common incentive schemes used in
determining CEOs’ compensation level (Holland & Ramsay 2003). These evidences strongly
imply that accounting benchmarks matter for managerial behaviour and provide incentives to
manipulate earnings.
It is a necessary condition that earnings manipulation is dependent on true earnings of a
firm. After all, earnings manipulation is not necessary when true earnings are adequate for the
current period. Researchers have modelled this conditionality in circumstances leading to
earnings manipulation. Fundengerg and Tirole (1995) present a theory that under the threat of
CEO dismissal, a manager’s decision to shift earnings is based on the firm’s pre-managed
earnings performance. They predict managerial action to shift future earnings to the current
period as poor current pre-managed earnings could lead to a manager being dismissed. Payne
and Robb (2000) found that when pre-managed earnings are below market expectation,
managers will use income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase earnings toward analysts’
forecasts. Gao and Shrieves (2002) showed the relationship between CEO compensation
components and earnings management is conditional on proximity of pre-managed earnings to
an earnings benchmark, the closer the level of pre-managed earnings to earnings benchmarks, the
more likely that managers engage in earnings management. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000b,
2005) found that firms with pre-managed earnings below zero or below last year’s earnings are
more likely to report positive discretionary accruals. Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2008) reported
that managers have the incentive to manage earnings upwards to avoid dividend cuts when
managers anticipate that pre-managed earnings would otherwise fall short of the expected
dividend levels.
Techniques to meet benchmarks are not limited to discretionary accruals only. Dechow et
al. (2000) found that working capital and positive special items, in addition to discretionary
accruals are used as mechanisms to achieve small profits and to meet analysts’ forecasts.
Analysts’ forecasts are also achieved through either managing sales upward or managing
operating expense downward (Plummer & Mest 2001). Phillips et al. (2003) found that deferred
tax expenses are associated with benchmark beating behaviour of reporting profits and earnings
increases, whereas total accruals are associated with benchmark beating behaviour of meeting
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using real earnings manipulations (accelerated sales recognition,
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increasing production to reduce cost of goods sold), Roychowdhury (2006) documented that
managers avoid reporting annual losses and negative changes in earnings. In a fundamental
sense, however, as observed by Jones (1991), management discretions are made through
accruals. More accruals are in place simply because the accounting system creates accruals to
recognise revenues when they are earned and match expenses to those revenues, irrespective of
whether cash has been received or paid. In addition, discretionary accruals are likely to be the
prime measures for earnings management because the level of discretionary accruals is difficult
to be monitored by outsiders (Gaver et al. 1995). Given the scope of this research, and based on
prior literature, we rely on the discretionary accruals (DA) of Jones (1991) to estimate earnings
manipulation. Nonetheless, we subject this estimation to alternate specifications and robust
adjustments.
In this paper, we postulate that when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks,
managers will inflate income to report profits and earnings increase. In our setting, the premanaged earnings is the condition of managerial discretion to adjust earnings from losses or
earnings decreases to report ex post profits or earnings increases. We examine firms with
negative pre-managed earnings (and pre-managed earning changes) and categorise them to have
negative profits or earnings decreases prior to any earnings manipulation. Our two hypotheses (in
alternative forms) are thus as follows:
H1: When pre-managed earnings are negative, firms are more likely to use
discretionary accruals to report marginal profit.
H2: When the current period pre-managed earning are below previous period
reported earning, firms are more likely to use discretionary accruals to report positive
change in earnings.
Research Methodology
Earnings Distribution
In a manner similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we construct histograms of the earnings
and earnings changes. Earnings are measured as income before extraordinary items deflated by
beginning total assets. The changes of earnings are measured as difference of income before
extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 deflated by beginning total assets. Our two
benchmarks are reported profits and earnings increases. Silverman (1986) and Scott (1992)
suggest that the interval width of a histogram should be positively related to the variability of the
data and negatively related to the number of observations. To determine the interval widths, we
performed both the calculations and the visual inspection, we calculate histograms interval width
as 2(IQR)n-1/3 , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and n is the number of observations.
This returns an interval width of 0.04 for both earnings level and earnings change distributions. 4
Although we would prefer to have a finer width, we are constrained by our sample size which is
smaller than those of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et
4

Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use interval widths of 0.005 for scaled earnings and 0.0025 for scaled changes in
earnings. Holland and Ramsay (2003) use 0.01 for scaled net profit after tax and 0.005 for scaled changes in net
profit after tax. Coulton et al. (2005) use 0.01 for both earnings levels and changes in earnings.
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al. (2005). Following our empirical calculation and visual inspection, we chose 0.04 as an
appropriate interval width for our sample size. This interval width is also consistent with Cheng
and Warfield (2005) who measure earnings surprises that are equal to or greater than four cents.
Figure 2-Histograms of earnings and pre-managed earnings changes
Panel A-Earnings changes (∆Eit)

Panel B-Pre-managed earnings changes (∆PMEit)
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We then formally test whether observed discontinuities are significant. Under the null
hypothesis with smooth earnings distribution, the standardised difference of each interval with
respect to distribution should be equal to zero (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). If managers
exercise positive discretionary accruals to report profits or earnings increase, we would expect to
see the standardised difference to be significantly negative for the interval immediately below
zero and significantly positive for the interval immediately above zero. The z-statistic used to
test the null is the difference between the actual and expected number of observations in an
interval divided by the estimated standard deviation of the difference.5
Discretionary Accruals
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Peasnell et al. (2000a)
evaluated different models in estimating discretionary accruals and suggested that the power to
The Z-statistic is defined as: Z= n  E ( n ) where n is actual number of observations in the interval; E(n) is
Var
expected number of observations in the interval, defined as the average of the number of observations in the
intervals immediately adjacent to the interval; Var is the estimated standard deviation of the difference, calculate
as: Var  N  p i (1  p i )  (1 / 4 ) N  ( p i 1  p i  1 )  (1  p i 1  p i  1 ) Where N is the total number of
;
observations and pi is the probability that an observation will fall into interval i
5
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detect earnings management seems to be higher for the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model. We
include change in cash flows from operations as an additional explanatory variable into the Jones
model based on evidence in McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Dechow (1994, 1995) indicating
that change in cash flow from operations are negatively correlated with total accruals. The
modified Jones model used in our analysis is:
TACit / TAit 1  a1 (1 / TAit 1 )  a2 (REVit / TAit 1 )  a3 ( PPEit / TAit 1 )   4 CFit   it

(1)

where TACit is total accruals for firm i for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1; total
accruals are calculated as the difference between net operating income and operating cash flows.
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i at the beginning of year t. ∆REVit is net sales for firm i for year t
less net sales for firm i for year t-1 scaled by total assets for year t-1. PPEit is the gross property,
plant and equipment for firm i for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1. ∆CFit is operating
cash flows for firm i for year t less operating cash flows for firm i in year t-1 scaled by total
assets for year t-1. α1, α2, α3,α4 denote industry year specific estimated coefficients. εit is the error
term.
Researchers also argue that tests related to earnings management that do no control for
a firm’s earnings performance are misspecified. For example, Dechow et al. (1995) found that
the measurement errors in estimation of discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with
firm earnings performance. We employ Kasznik’s (1999) matched-portfolio technique to adjust
potential measurement error that is correlated with earnings performance. First, we obtain
discretionary accruals, i.e. the residual from cross sectionally estimating equation (1) by GICS
industry and by year. Then, we rank discretionary accruals into percentile groups by return on
assets in period t (ROAt), defined as operating income deflated by lagged total assets. We then
compute the median discretionary accruals for each percentile and subtract it from each
observation’s discretionary accruals in that percentile (see equation 2). By standardising the
residuals in this manner we remove the possible bias that firms having higher (lower) residuals
are likely to manage earnings at a rate higher (lower) than the median performance firm. As such
our measure of discreationary accrual is

Adj ( DAit )  DAit  Median( DA) pt

(2)

Where DAit is raw discretionary accruals for firm i for year t obtained as residual from
equation (1), Median(DA)pt is median value of the discretionary accruals for a portfolio p at year
t, and p is the percentile ranking of raw discretionary accruals based on firm’s return on assets.
Pre-managed Earnings
The research design used in this study involves examining the link between discretionary
accruals and whether pre-managed earnings are below or above earnings benchmarks. By
definition, the sum of true pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals is equal to reported
earnings. Following Gore et al. (2007), the pre-managed earnings are measured as earnings in
year t minus adjusted discretionary accruals and is used to capture the true earnings levels prior
to managerial manipulation; the pre-managed changes in earnings are measured as the difference
between earnings in year t and year t-1 minus adjusted discretionary accruals and is used to
capture the true earnings changes before earnings management.
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PMEit = Eit  Adj( DA) it
PMEit = Eit  Adj ( DA) it

(3)
(4)

Where PMEit is pre-managed earnings; ∆PMEit is pre-managed earnings change; Eit is
reported earnings, measured as income before extraordinary items deflate by the beginning total
assets; ∆Eit is reported earnings change, measured as the difference of income before
extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 deflated by the beginning total assets; Adj(DA)it
is adjusted discretionary accruals obtained from equation (2); i and t denote firm and year,
respectively.
Regression Model
In testing under what circumstances managers will inflate income to beat two earnings
benchmarks, we predict when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks, managers will
inflate income to report profits and report earnings increase. We test whether firms with premanaged earnings below benchmarks will use positive discretionary accruals to beat the
benchmarks. Accordingly, our dependent variable is the adjusted discretionary variable
( Adj ( DAit ) from equation (2) above.
We partition our sample where pre-managed earnings (changes) are below and
above zero. The changes in earnings and pre-managed earnings are standardised around 0. We
then condition our analysis by having firms which have the reported earnings (changes) above
zero. These firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management as their
pre-managed earnings levels (changes) are below benchmarks but try to report ex post profits
(earnings increases). Following Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005), we also
focus on small earnings intervals of [−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04] immediately surrounding these
benchmarks. Firms which are expected to make small losses (earnings decreases) are more likely
than other firms to engage in earnings manipulation. Accordingly, we create several clusters of
firms based on these benchmarks conditioned on changes in earnings and pre-managed earnings.
Our regression model to test earnings management behaviour takes the following form:
Adj(DA)it = α0+β1CLUSTER_Nit+β2SIZEit+β3GROWTHit+β4ROAit+β5WCit
+β6LEVit +βj Σ INDj+єit
(5)
The variable of interest in this model is the indicator variable CLUSTER_Nit. The
CLUSTER_Nit takes four constrained form as follows:
CLUSTER_1it = 1 if (PMEit <0 OR ∆PMEit<0), 0 otherwise;
CLUSTER_2it = 1 if (PMEit <0, Eit ≥0 OR ∆PMEit <0, ∆Eit ≥0), 0 otherwise;
CLUSTER_3it = 1 if (−0.04≤PMEit <0 OR −0.04≤∆PMEit <0), 0 otherwise;
CLUSTER_4it =1 if (−0.04≤PMEit <0, 0≤Eit <0.04 or −0.04≤∆PMEit <0, 0≤∆Eit <0.04), 0
otherwise.
According to our hypotheses, we should see a positive association between the
use of discretionary accruals and the firms in each of these clusters. If managers use discretion to
inflate income in order to beat benchmarks, conditioned on the pre-managed earnings, the
coefficients on CLUSTER_Nit are expected to be positive across all four clusters. The first cluster
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(CLUSTER_1it ) is a partition of our sample consisting of firms that have either negative or
decline of earnings on a pre-managed basis. CLUSTER_2it is a subset of CLUSTER_1it having
firms reporting positive earnings or positive change in earnings. CLUSTER_3it and
CLUSTER_4it are similar to previous clusters but belong to group of firms who have narrowly
missed out on earnings performance in terms of their pre-managed earnings. We define these
narrowly missing firms as ‘just-miss’ firms.
In our cross sectional regression, we employ a vector of control variables
recognised from previous literature to be associated with discretionary accruals. We control for
firm size (SIZEit), measured as the logarithm of the total assets at year t, as smaller firms are
documented to be associated with earnings management (Chan, Faff & Ramsay 2005; Holland &
Jackson 2004; Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca 2007; Sloan 1996). The growth opportunity
(GROWTHit), measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1 divided by total assets at
year t. As growth firms have relatively strong incentives to meet earnings benchmarks the market
penalises growth firms for negative earnings surprise (Barth, Elliott & Finn 1999; Beaver,
Kettler5 & Scholes 1970; Minton & Schrand, 1999; Myers & Skinner, 2006; Skinner & Sloan,
2002). Profitability (ROAit), measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i
at year t, is included because prior studies either found lower accounting profits provide
motivation for firms to manipulate earnings to mitigate financial constraints (Ashari et al. 1994;
White 1970;), or earnings management firms tend to exhibit a high profitability as it affect
managers’ job security and the compensation contract (Degeorge et al, Patell & Zueckhauser
1999; Fudenberg & Tirole 1995; Hayn 1995). We expect that firms with greater working capital
level (WCit), measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i
in year t, are more likely to manage earnings to move from below a benchmark to above the
benchmark because short-term working capital accrual gives managers more flexibility in
exercising discretions (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). We control for a firm’s proximity to debt
covenant violation (LEVit), measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t, and a
positive sign is expected (Dechow et al. 2000; Press &Weintrop 1990; Watts & Zimmerman
1978). Finally, we control for industry effects. INDjt equals 1 if firm i is from jth GICS industry
(Energy, Material, Metals and Mining, Industries, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples,
Health Care, Information Technology, Telecommunication and Utilities) and 0 otherwise.
The data set used in our study is of panel structure. With panel data structure, the OLS
assumption of independence in regression error term is generally violated by the presence of both
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Greene 2002). We use a two-way cluster-robust
regression to correct both cross-sectional and serial correlations (Thompson 2006). The two-way
cluster-robust procedure allows clustering along the two dimensions and generates the
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors of White (1980).

Data and Sample Selection
The starting point for the sample is the population of all ASX listed firms in the DataStream
database including active file, suspended file and dead file with necessary annual accounting and
market data from the period 1999 to 2006. The initial sample includes 3,914 firms with 31,312
observations. This study excludes all firms in the financial sector with GICS code (4010-4040)
since their financial statements are subject to special accounting regulations. They include 45
banks, 194 equity investment instruments, 228 general financial, 5 life insurance, 44 nonequity
invest instruments, 19 nonlife insurance, 276 real estates, altogether 811 firms and 6,488
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observations. Regulated firms from the Utilities sector have not been eliminated as the number is
relatively few in Australia. Also excluded are 1,832 firm observations whose industry codes are
unclassified by DataStream. A further 16,910 firm observations are omitted since necessary data
for accrual estimation is missing: this includes the loss of observations for 1999 as lagged
variables of total assets and first differencing taken for the variables of revenue, account
receivables, and operating cash flows are required in regressions. Firms involved in restructuring
activities with 10 observations are excluded. The entire ASX covers very large companies from
the Top 200 ASX index, also included are many very small listed companies. Thus, the top and
the bottom 1 % observations by extreme values of total assets are trimmed, including 125
observations. These sampling criteria resulted in a sample with necessary data for 5,947 firmyear observations for accrual estimation.
Since the estimation of the cross-sectional accrual model requires at least ten firms per
industry-year combination, industry groups with fewer than ten observations in a given sample
year are combined if they have close??GICS codes. As Australian markets are dominated by
gold and mining industries, the Metals & Mining sector is extracted from the Material sector to
see whether this sector has an industry cluster effect on earnings management practices. Both
Metals & Mining and Material sectors use the same code (GICS 1510). This procedure results in
nine GICS industry groups, that is, Energy (1010), Material (1510), Metals & Mining (1510),
Industrials (2010-2030), Consumer Discretionary (2510-2550), Consumer Staples (3010-3030),
Health Care (3510-3520), Information Technology (4510-4530), and Telecommunication &
Utilities (5010-5510). Each of the firm-year observations in the estimation sample is assigned
into one of the nine combined industry groups according to the GICS code. These criteria result
in a final sample of 4,746 firm-year observations (Table 1 Panel A). Panel B and C of Table 1
report the distribution of firms across industry and years in our sample.

Table 1
Sample description
Panel A-Sample construction
The sample comprises DataStream equity files including all active suspended and dead equity firms from year 2000
to year 2006
Criteria

Firm-year

Initial firm-years with accounting data:

35,226

Less: Financial firms
Industries are not classified
Missing data
Extreme data (trimmed at 5% and 95% levels)

(7,299)
(2,061)
(21,007)
(110)

Final sample

4,746
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Panel B- Final Sample by Industry

6.31
7.13

Cumulative
Frequency
299
638

Cumulative
Percent
6.31
13.44

1454

30.64

2092

44.08

Industrials

263

5.56

2355

49.64

783

16.48

3138

66.12

3010-3030

Consumer
Discretionary
Consumer Staples

391

8.24

3529

74.36

3510-3520

Health Care

477

10.07

4006

84.43

4510-4530

Information
Technology
Telecommunication
& Utilities

618

13.02

4624

97.45

122

2.56

4746

100.00

GICS

Industry

Frequency

Percent

1010
1510

Energy
Material

299
339

1510

Metals & Mining

2010-2030
2510-2550

5010-5510

Panel C-Final Sample by Year
Year

Frequency

Percent

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

184
265
502
442
959
1163
1231

3.88
5.56
10.58
9.32
20.20
24.50
25.95

Cumulative
Frequency
184
449
951
1393
2352
3515
4746

Cumulative
Percent
3.88
9.44
20.02
29.34
49.55
74.05
100.00

Panel D-Summary statistics
Variables
E
ΔE
PME
ΔPME
DA
Adj (DA)
SIZE
GROWTH
ROA
WC
LEV

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

25%

75%

Max

-0.1242
0.0396
-0.1261
0.0378
-0.0271
0.0019
10.5250
0.7311
-0.0841
0.2370
0.1683

-0.0291
0.0033
-0.0409
-0.0011
-0.0037
-0.0000
10.1603
0.0854
-0.0361
0.1475
0.0812

0.3020
0.6166
0.3189
0.6169
0.1320
0.0867
2.0809
5.5019
0.2814
0.5487
0.3089

-1.6713
-2.8276
-1.8191
-2.8641
-0.4024
-0.1897
5.8972
-1.0000
-3.4855
-9.3901
0.0000

-0.2517
-0.0806
-0.2693
-0.1096
-0.0828
-0.0563
8.9939
-0.0970
-0.1908
0.0238
0.0000

0.0644
0.0649
0.0761
0.1028
0.0655
0.0574
11.8425
0.3262
0.0781
0.3532
0.2666

0.5340
17.9975
0.6650
17.8976
0.3369
0.2141
16.0523
168.1289
1.3880
10.6387
9.0425

Variable definitions:
E
ΔE

=
=

PME
ΔPME
DA
Adj (DA)

=
=
=
=

Reported earnings level, measured as income before extraordinary items deflate by the beginning total assets
Reported earnings change, measured as the difference of income before extraordinary items between year t and year t-1
deflate by the beginning total assets
Pre-managed earnings level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals
Pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals
Raw discretionary accruals, estimated from the cash flow Jones model
Adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated as raw discretionary accruals adjust for extreme earnings performance
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SIZE
GROWTH
ROA
WC
LEV

=
=
=
=
=

Firm size, measured by the logarithm of the total assets
Growth opportunity, measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1 divided by the beginning total assets
Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets
Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities
Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets

Basic descriptive statistics (Table 2) show that mean (median) reported earnings (E) and
earnings change (ΔE) are −0.1242 (−0.0291) and 0.0396 (0.0033), respectively. The mean
(median) of pre-managed earnings (PME) and their changes (ΔPME) are −0.1261 (−0.0409).
Mean of (median) raw discretionary accruals is −0.0271 (−0.0037).

Table 2
Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings
Panel A-Reported earnings level and change
_______∆E_______

___________E_______
Intervals
−0.20
−0.16
−0.12
−0.08
−0.04
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.20

Obs, Freq. (%)
0.038
0.039
0.051
0.053
0.057
0.086
0.131
0.112
0.055
0.032
0.024

Obs – Exp.
0.003
−0.006
0.005
−0.001
−0.013
−0.008
0.070
0.019
−0.017
−0.008
0.002

z-stat
0.89
−1.72
1.31
−0.25
−2.89***
−1.61
5.52***
3.53
−4.07
−2.48
0.75

Obs, Freq. (%)
0.027
0.03
0.045
0.061
0.105
0.213
0.135
0.056
0.039
0.025
0.021

Obs – Exp.
0.001
−0.006
−0.001
−0.014
−0.032
0.093
0.001
−0.031
−0.002
−0.005
0.002

z-stat
0.18
−2.00
−0.14
−3.39
−6.15***
13.60***
0.08
−7.06
−0.43
−1.74
0.58

Panel B-Pre-managed earnings level and change
_____∆PME____

__PME____
Intervals
−0.20
−0.16
−0.12
−0.08
−0.04
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.20

Obs, Freq. (%)
0.037
0.043
0.044
0.058
0.063
0.083
0.092
0.081
0.063
0.049
0.029

Obs – Exp.
−0.002
0.003
−0.007
0.005
−0.008
0.006
0.010
0.004
−0.002
0.003
−0.006

z-stat
−0.60
0.85
−1.94
1.24
−1.88
1.26
1.90
0.83
−0.46
0.77
−1.92

Obs, Freq. (%)
0.053
0.039
0.058
0.074
0.092
0.068
0.082
0.058
0.076
0.047
0.034

Obs – Exp.
0.026
−0.017
0.002
−0.001
0.021
−0.019
0.019
−0.021
0.024
−0.008
0.004

z-stat
1.93
−1.33
0.11
−0.06
1.19
−1.19
1.13
−1.41
1.45
−0.58
0.34

Notes:
1).Earnings (changes) are deflated total assets as of the beginning of the annual period. The expected frequency is computed as the mean of the
frequency in the two adjacent intervals. For the sake of the brevity, only intervals with earnings (changes) scaled by total assets ranging from −0.2
to 0.2 are presented in the table. The intervals are of width 0.04 of total asset. The frequencies are expressed as percentage of the total sample.
2). *** marks the significance levels are at 1% or better for the test of the intervals immediately below or above benchmarks.
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Results
Do Firms Beat Benchmarks?
Figure 1, Panel A is a histogram of reported earnings levels with an interval width of 0.04 and a
range of -1 to +1. This histogram shows the appearance of a single-peaked, bell-shaped
distribution with discontinuities surrounding the standardised zero earnings benchmark.
According to our standardised distribution, the expected frequency for firms who are in the
interval of [-0.04, 0] is the average of the two adjacent intervals and is 0.70%. However, the
observed frequency of reported earnings, E, is 0.57% for firms who are in this interval. This
difference in observed frequency being less than the expected frequency by 0.13% (“obs-exp”
column) is borne out by our Z-test statistic of -2.89 which is significant at one-percent level.
The firms reporting earnings between the interval of [-0.04, 0] are just-miss firms and
their frequency under a normal distribution should not differ significantly for the rest of the
distribution. This discontinuity in distribution suggests that some firms in this group may have
boosted their earnings to go over the zero-benchmark to report positive earnings. Turning our
attention to the group of firms which lie just above the zero-benchmark, we find their observed
frequency is more than the expected frequency by 0.07% (0.131% versus 0.061%) and
significantly so through our z-test statistic of 5.52 at one-percent level. If managers resort to
earnings manipulation to report small profits, earnings discontinuity should be observed at the
interval [0, +0.04], as is the case. The number of firms in the earnings interval of [0, +0.04]
being in excess of the expected frequency bolsters the suggestion that there may be manipulation
of earnings surrounding the zero-benchmark.
This discontinuity is also apparent when we consider the change in reported earnings
(ΔE). The observed frequency of firms reporting just below the standardised earning of nochange benchmark, in the interval [-0.04, 0], is below the expected frequency by 0.032%. This
difference is also highly significant through the z-test statistic of -6.15. Further evidence of
possible earnings manipulation can be seen by observing the frequency difference for the group
of firms at zero-change earnings benchmark. If the purpose of earnings management is to sustain
last year’s earning, then the discontinuity would also occur just at the zero interval when the
change in earnings is considered as a benchmark. The observed frequency of firms reporting
zero-change in earnings is significantly higher (z-stat=13.60)) than the expected frequency of
0.118%.
Next we generate a histogram for pre-managed earnings which are purged of the effect of
discretionary accruals. Figure 1 Panel B displays the distribution of pre-managed earning levels
that appears to be relatively smooth around zero. The smoothness is confirmed through the Zstatistics of standardised difference of frequencies immediately below and above zero-PME
intervals and found to be insignificant (-1.88 and 1.90 respectively). Given that our adjusted
discretionary accruals are a proxy of earnings management, the removal of adjusted discretionary
accruals confirms the evidence of earnings manipulation. That is, in the absence of a
discretionary component of accruals, the earnings of firms revert to their expected distribution.
A similar result of no discontinuity is observed when we consider the distribution of change in
pre-managed earnings. Our result from the distribution of pre-managed earnings, in levels and in
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changes, is consistent with the prediction that the removal of adjusted discretionary accruals
results in the disappearance of the discontinuity6.

Figure 1
Distributions of earnings and pre-managed earnings
Panel A-Earnings levels (Eit)

Panel B-Pre-managed eanings level (PMEit)
0. 10

0. 14

0. 12

0. 08
0. 10

P
r 0. 06
o
p
o
r
t
i
o 0. 04
n

P
r
o 0. 08
p
o
r
t
i 0. 06
o
n

0. 04

0. 02
0. 02

0

0

-1 -0. 88 -0. 76 -0. 64 -0. 52 -0. 4 -0. 28 -0. 16 -0. 04 0. 08 0. 2 0. 32 0. 44 0. 56 0. 68 0. 8 0. 92

-1 -0. 88 -0. 76 -0. 64 -0. 52 -0. 4 -0. 28 -0. 16 -0. 04 0. 08 0. 2 0. 32 0. 44 0. 56 0. 68 0. 8 0. 92

Premanaged_Earni ngs_l evel

Earni ngs_l evel

Do Firms Shift Earnings When Pre-managed Earnings are Below (or above) Benchmarks?
Table 3 shows the levels and changes of earnings surrounding our benchmarks, conditioned on
pre-managed earnings. Panel A reports proportions of observations when the sample is divided
according to reported earnings, Eit, being above or below zero, conditional on the pre-managed
earnings being above or below zero. The overall proportion of firms with underlying earnings
being less than zero is 57.71% (N=2739). However, when we portioned them according to actual
reported earnings we found that 8.11% (N=385) have reported positive profits. In order to
examine the possibility that this shift in reported earnings is due to earnings management, we
check the differences in proportions for the overall group of firms that reported positive earnings
against the proportion that has the PMEit >0. The portion of observations with the PMEit being
more than zero is 42.29% (N=2007). Under the assumption that there is no attempt to manage
earnings to report an ex-post profit, we should expect the frequency of our sample that reported
profits, Eit ≥ 0, to be close to 42.29%. However, we find that the frequency of reported profits is
6

Holland and Ramsay (2003) use interval width of 0.01 in the range -0.25 to +0.24, and their test statistics are 2.83 for the interval immediately below zero and 3.85 for the interval immediately above zero. This result is also
consistent with Coulton et al. (2005) who use 0.01 interval width for in a range of -0.24 to +0.24.
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45.36% (N=2153). Following Kanji (1993), we apply the z-test for correlated change in the
frequency before and after a given intervention and find the two frequencies are statistically
different (z-statistic=5.87, p-value=0.001). This evidence suggests that discretionary accruals
have the effect of significantly increasing the frequency of positive earnings levels.
Discretionary accruals also significantly increase the frequency of firms reporting small
profits. Table 3 Panel A also shows frequencies of firms within small intervals of earnings,
[−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04], conditioned on similar intervals of pre-managed earnings. The
frequency of firms reporting small earnings profits while their underlying pre-managed earnings
is ‘just-miss’ is 11.82% (N=561). However, the overall proportion of firms with pre-managed
earnings being positive is only 8.83% (N=419). This is a difference of 2.99 per cent of total
sample with 142 observations and statistically different from zero using the Kanji z-test with a z
value of 3.81. This evidence suggests that for some just-miss firms, discretionary accruals were
used to report a just-above profit. We also find that within this subsample, 2.44 per cent (N=116)
shift from pre-managed small earnings losses (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) to report small earnings profits
(0 ≤ Eit < +0.04) with significance level being less than one per cent (not reported in the table)7.
Table 3, Panel B reports the impact of discretionary accruals on changes in reported
earnings conditioned by the changes in pre-managed earnings. In our sample, the overall
frequency of firms reporting increases in earnings is 52.19% (N=2477). At the same time, the
proportion of firms reporting earnings increase while the pre-managed earnings change is also
positive is 49.68% (N=2358). This difference in proportion is statistically different with a z-test
statistic of 3.81. Moreover, 11.61 per cent (N=551) shift from a negative pre-managed earnings
change (∆PMEit < 0) to report positive earnings change (∆Eit ≥ 0). This finding is consistent
with the argument that managers inflate earnings through discretionary accruals to transform
previous year’s lower earnings to report earnings that are higher than or at least equal to previous
year’s level.
In the small intervals of [−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04], discretionary accruals also significantly
increase the frequency of firms reporting small positive earnings change. Panel B Table 3 shows
the frequency of firms reporting earnings change surrounding the zero-benchmark increases from
11.23 per cent (N=533) of the sub-sample when pre-managed earnings change is also positive, to
13.49 per cent when the overall group of just-above firms in the whole sample is considered
(N=640). This is a shift of 2.26 per cent (N=123) and statistically significant at below one
percent level with z-stat of 2.688. Further, 3.88 per cent (N=184) shift from small pre-managed
earnings decrease (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0) to report small earnings increase (0 ≤ ∆Eit < 0.04), with
the shift in proportion being significant (z-statistic= 2.68, p-value=0.01). Taken all. together, the
results in Table 3 provides evidence that some firms use discretionary accruals to transform
earnings in their levels and changes to report positive ex-post profits and earnings increases, shift
small losses and earnings decreases into a zero or above profit and a small earnings increases
while the underlying pre-managed earnings levels and changes may not be positive.

7

Burgastahler and Dichev (1997) reported that 30−40% of U.S firms exercise discretion to report profits when premanaged earnings are slightly negative. Comparatively, our results suggest a lower frequency of earnings
management in Australia among the firms confronted with reporting earnings losses.
8
Burgastahler and Dichev (1997) reported that in the U.S 8 to 12% of firms with small pre-managed earnings
decreases exercise discretion to report earnings increase. Our result of 2.26 per cent is lower than that of
Burgastahler and Dichev.
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Table 3
Frequencies of observations shifting from pre-managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks to above
benchmarks
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level
Firm-years with
PMEit < 0
Firm-years with
PMEit ≥ 0
Total

Eit < 0
2354
49.60%
239
5.04%
2593
54.64%

Eit ≥ 0
385
8.11%
1768
37.25%
2153
45.36%

Total
2739
57.71%
2007
42.29%
4746
100%

Firm-years with
-0.04≤PMEit<0
Firm-years with
0≤PMEit<0.04
Total

-0.04≤Eit<0
60
1.26%
57
1.20%
270c
5.68%

0≤Eit<0.04
116
2.44%
119
2.51%
621d
13.08%

361a
7.61%
419b
8.83%
4746
100%

ΔEit<0

ΔEit≥0

Total

1837
38.71%
432
9.10%
2269
47.81%

551
11.61%
1926
40.58%
2477
52.19%

2388
50.32%
2358
49.68%
4746
100%

-0.04≤ΔEit <0
147
3.10%
136
2.87%
498c
10.49%

0≤ΔEit<0.04
184
3.88%
202
4.26%
640d
13.49%

527a
11.10%
533b
11.23%
4746
100%

z-statd

5.87

4.49

Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change
Firm-years with
ΔPMEit <0
Firm-years with
ΔPMEit ≥0
Total

Firm-years with
-0.04≤ΔPMEit <0
Firm-years with
0≤ΔPMEit<0.04
Total

z-stat

3.81

2.68

a. the total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0];
b. the total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04];
c. the total number of observations of which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0]; d. the total number of observations of
which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04]
d.. The Z statistics are computed from Kanji (1993) for correlated proportions and their shifts .

Z 

(b  c ) / N

Z = Z score test for the significant change in the correlated frequency before and after a given intervention

(b  c )  (b  c ) / N
N ( N  1)
2

b = the number of observations shifts from pre-managed earnings losses to the reported earnings profits
c = the number of observations shifts from pre-managed earnings profits to the reported earnings losses
N = the total number of observations

e. Significance levels are two-tailed against the standardized normal distribution.
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Do Firms have Higher Value of Discretionary Accruals when Pre-managed Earnings are Below
Benchmarks?
We now turn our attention to the degrees of earnings management when the pre-managed
earnings are below benchmarks. Our focus in this section is to see if the usage of discretionary
accruals is limited only to firms who report ‘small-profits’. Amongst all firms, firms most likely
to manage earnings are likely to be those which are just-miss firms on the pre-managed earnings
basis and may use the earnings manipulation methods to push the reported earnings above the
benchmarks.
Table 4 presents the frequencies of adjusted discretionary accruals conditioned on premanaged earnings. Panel A shows that, of all the firms which have positive discretionary
accruals, roughly two thirds of firms (62.91%, N=1723) have underlying losses on a premanaged basis (PMEi t< 0). If discretionary accruals (positive and negative) are to be randomly
distributed amongst all firms, we would expect to see their distribution evenly split between
firms which are making losses and profits on a pre-managed basis. This evidence suggests those
firms with a pre-managed loss have a lot more usage of the positive discretionary accruals and
thereby inflating earnings than those making pre-managed profits. A similar comparison for
firms in small intervals surrounding the zero-benchmark (−0.04≤PMEit<0) shows that 58.72 per
cent (N=212) of pre-managed small-loss making firms have positive discretionary accruals while
the corresponding frequency for small-profit making firms (0≤PMEit<+0.04) is 45.34 per cent. In
Panel B, when we condition the discretionary accruals with corresponding changes in premanaged earnings 69.14 per cent (N=1651) of firms with negative changes in pre-managed
earnings have positive discretionary accruals as compared to only 30.58 per cent (N=721) when
the underlying pre-managed earning changes are positive (∆PMEit ≥ 0). In the smaller intervals,
there are 57.31 per cent of firms (N=302) with pre-managed earnings slightly below last year’s
earnings (−0.04≤∆PMEit<0) that have positive discretionary accruals, whereas 33.21 per cent of
firms (N=177) with pre-managed earnings slightly above last year’s earnings (0≤∆PMEit<0.04)
show positive discretionary accruals. This evidence in table 4 suggest that firms are likely to
have much more usage of positive discretionary accruals when faced with negative changes in
underlying earnigns, possibly to manipulate and report earnings higher than last year’s earnings.
This pattern is especially prominent for those firms which can be characterised as just-miss
firms.
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Table 4
Frequencies of positive adjusted discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings (changes) below
benchmarks
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level
Firm-years with
PMEit < 0
Firm-years with
PMEit ≥ 0
Total

Adj(DA)it < 0
1016
37.09%
1358
67.66%
2374

113
Firm-years with
31.309%
-0.04≤PMEit<0
137
Firm-years with
32.69%
0≤PMEit<0.04
Total
250
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change
Adj(DA)it < 0
Firm-years with
737
∆PMEit < 0
30.86%
1637
Firm-years with
69.42%
∆PMEit ≥ 0
Total
2374
Firm-years with
-0.04≤ΔPMEit <0
Firm-years with
0≤ΔPMEit<0.04
Total

172
32.64%
279
52.34%
451

Adj(DA)it ≥ 0
1723
62.91%
649
32.34%
2372

Total
2739
100%
2007
100%
4746

212
58.72%
190
45.34%
402

361
100%
419
100%
780

Adj(DA)it ≥ 0
1651
69.14%
721
30.58%
2372

Total
2388
100%
2358
100%
4746

302
57.31%
177
33.21%
479

527
100%
533
100%
1060

Note: This table evaluates whether firms with pre-managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks more likely to exercise positive
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards. PME is pre-managed earnings level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted
discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals; Adj
(DA) is adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from Jones (1991) version cash flows model adjust for extreme earnings performance

Table 5 reports the mean and median levels of discretionary accruals conditioned on premanaged earnings. Panel A reports that firms with pre-managed earnings below zero have
significantly positive mean and median discretionary accruals of 0.0273 and 0.0311
resepectively while firms with pre-managed earnings of above zero exhibit significantly negative
mean and median discretionary accruals of −0.0329 and −0.0292. Two sample t-test for the
mean show that discretionary accruals are significantly different between the two sub samples of
pre-managed earnings partitioned at zero. This result supports our earlier result in table 4 that
firms with negative pre-managed earnings have higher usage of positive discretionary accruals.
Within the small interval of [−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0] discretionary accruals of firms with premanaged earnings loss there is significantly positive mean and median, 0.0154 and 0.0260,
respectively. Further, the mean and median discretionary accruals of firms within the interval of
[0 ≤ PMEit < 0.04] are statistically not different from zero. For the firms whose pre-managed
earnings are already positive, though small, are already meeting benchmarks and hence do not
have incentive to manipulate earnings.
Panel B of Table 5 shows a similar pattern of Adj(DA)it to that of Panel A when premanaged earnings change is considered. Firms with negative pre-managed earnings change have
higher positive discretionary accruals than those with positive pre-managed earnings change. The
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mean (median) discretionary accruals for firms with worsening pre-managed earnings (∆PMEit <
0) is 0.0336 (0.0349) and significantly positive. However, when we consider firms with
improving pre-managed earnings (∆PMEit > 0), the mean (median) discretionary accruals is
significantly negative −0.0303 (−0.0334). Within the small interval of pre-managed earnings
change (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0), the mean (median) discretionary accruals of firms within is also
positive 0.0099 (0.0129) and significantly different from zero. Conversely the mean (median)
discretionary accruals of firms within the small interval of positive change in pre-managed
earnings (0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04) is significantly negative at −0.0073 (−0.0090). Two sample t- tests
show that discretionary accruals are significantly different between two sub samples of premanaged earnings that are below and above last year’s earnings.

Table 5
Adjusted discretionary accruals comparing firms with pre-managed earnings are below to above
benchmarks
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level

N
Adj(DA)

Adj(DA)

Mean

Median

0.0273***

0.0311
***

2739

Test for difference

PME ≥ 0
_______________________

PME < 0
__________________________
N

Mean

2007

−0.0329***

____________________
t-test
p-value

Median
−0.0292***

25.96

<.0001

−0.04 ≤ PME < 0

0 ≤ PME < 0.04

Test for difference

____________________________
N
Mean
Median

_____________________________
N
Mean
Median

______________________
t-test
p-value

361

0.0154***

0.0260***

419

0.0010

0.0073

2.98

0.0029

Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change
∆PME ≥ 0
__________________________
N
Mean
Median

∆PME < 0
_________________________
N
Mean
Median
Adj(DA)

Test for difference
___________________
t-test
pvalue
27.36

2388

0.0336***

0.0349***

−0.04 ≤ ∆PME < 0
_________________________
N
Mean
Median

2358

−0.0303***

0 ≤ ∆PME < 0.04
____________________________
N
Mean
Median

Test for difference
__________________
t-test
p-value
4.84

Adj(DA)

527

0.0099***

0.0129***

−0.0073***

533

Note:

47

<.0001

−0.0334***

−0.0090***

<.0001
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1).This table evaluates whether discretionary accruals are different between pre-managed earnings loss (decline) firms and pre-managed earnings
profit (increase) firms. We compare two intervals: (1) pre-managed earnings loss (decline) versus pre-managed earnings profit (increase); and (2)
small pre-managed earnings loss (decline) versus small pre-managed earnings profit (increase). PME is pre-managed earnings level, calculated as
reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus
adjusted discretionary accruals; Adj (DA) is adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from Jones (1991) version cash flows model adjust for
extreme earnings performance. 2). T-statistics are based on t-test for the difference in means across samples and p-values are two-tailed.

These results support our prediction that firms manage earnings upward when the firm’s
pre-managed earnings performance under-shoots the benchmark. Our results are consistent with
Peasnell et al. (2000a, 2005) who find evidence of ‘cookie-jar’ accounting and that earnings
management to beat benchmarks is associated with board composition of non-executive and
outside board members. Our evidence supports the ‘cookie jar accounting’ theory of managers
decreasing earnings when pre-managed earnings are well above benchmarks in order to save
some income to beat benchmarks in the future. This is also consistent with Degeorge et al.
(1999) who documented that managers systematically manipulate reported earnings downwards
when pre-managed earnings exceed threshold earnings by a substantial amount.

Discretionary Accruals and Pre-managed Earnings Benchmarks
In this section, we test whether discretionary accruals associated with pre-managed earnings fall
short of particular benchmarks. We use equation (5) to test for benchmarks after controlling for
firm size, growth rate, profitability, working capital, leverage, and industry effects discussed
earlier.9 Since our focus is on the association between benchmarks and discretionary accruals, we
do not discuss estimates of controlling factors but are note them in tables.
Regression models 1 and 2 of Table 6 Panel A present regression results of Adj(DAit) of
firms with underlying losses. The positive and significant coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_1 in
model 1 is consistent with the hypothesis that managers make use of positive discretionary
accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative. In model 2, we restrict our sample to firms
reporting ex-post profits (Eit ≥ 0) while the underlying earnings are negative. The coefficient on
CLUSTER_2 is significantly positive, indicating that for these profit reporting firms, managers
tend to use positive discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative. It should be
also noted that the coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_2 is stronger than CLUSTER_1 (0.0819
versus 0.1126). This larger estimate on CLUSTER_2 provides some evidence that the earnings
management activity is likely to be concentrated in firms that have reported positive profits
among the loss-making firms. Model 3 and 4 are regressions based on small intervals
surrounding zero. Both coefficients on CLUSTER_3 and CLUSTER_4 are significant positive,
which is consistent with the view that when firms have pre-managed earnings slightly below
zero, managers use positive discretionary accruals to inflate reported earnings to report small
profits. Again, the larger coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_4 (0.0403 versus 0.0268) signifies
our conjecture that small-loss firms have stronger incentive to use discretionary accruals to push
into positive profit territory. Expectedly the predictive ability of our model, signified by R2
estimates of regressions, increases as testing intervals move from bigger to smaller and more
specific regions surrounding benchmark. Nevertheless these results validate our hypotheses that
firms use discretionary accruals to beat benchamarks.

9

For the sake of brevity, the control variables results are not discussed.
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Table 6
Two-way cluster-robust regression of adjusted discretionary accruals on pre-managed earnings are below
benchmarks and control variables
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level
Independent Variables

Expected sign

Intercept

?

CLUSTER_1 ( PMEit <0)

+

CLUSTER_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0)

+

CLUSTER_3 (−0.04≤PMEit<0)

+

CLUSTER_4 (−0.04≤ PMEit <0,
0≤ Eit <0.04)
SIZE

+
−

GROWTH

+

ROA

?

WC

+

LEV

?

INDUSTRY EFFECTS
N
Adj. R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0450
(-3.45)***
0.0819
(25.87)***

-0.0381
(-2.44)**

-0.0052
(-0.35)

-0.0295
(-3.03)***

0.1126
(29.39)***
0.0268
(8.41)***
-0.0012
(-1.61)
0.0000
(0.84)
0.0856
(14.10)***
0.0123
(3.46)***
0.0159
(3.66)***
Yes
2739
0.2005

-0.0019
(-2.28)**
0.0000
(0.84)
0.0917
(8.82)***
0.0149
(2.37)**
0.0425
(4.48)***
Yes
385
0.3521

-0.0015
(-1.50)
-0.0003
(-1.45)
0.4518
(25.67)***
0.0272
(4.38)***
0.0007
(0.07)
Yes
361
0.5610

0.0403
(19.29)***
0.0015
(2.32)**
0.0002
(0.18)
0.0459
(3.03)***
0.0140
(2.18)**
-0.0021
(-0.29)
Yes
116
0.6437

Adj(D
A)
CLUST
ER

=

Adjusted discretionary accruals scaled by total asset at year t-1, estimated from equation (2)

=

SIZE
GROW
T
ROA
WC
LEV
∑j INDj

=
=

An indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) is less than zero and zero otherwise. We test four regions for each of
earnings benchmarks, where 1) PMEit (∆PMEit ) < 0; 2) PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; Eit (∆Eit ) ≥ 0; 3) −0.04≤ PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; and 4) −0.04≤
PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; 0 ≤ Eit< 0.04. Pre-managed earnings level (PME) are defined as reported earnings (E) minus adjusted discretionary
accruals; pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME), calculated as reported earnings change (ΔE) minus adjusted discretionary accruals (see
Equation 3,4)
Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total assets at year t;
Growth opportunity for firm i for year t, measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1 divided by total assets at year t

=
=
=
=

Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i at year t
Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i in year t
Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t
1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS industrial codes and 0 otherwise

2). P-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
3). the estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) method.

Table 7 shows regression tests of Adj(DAit) of firms which have pre-managed earnings
below last year’s earnings. We find positive and significant coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_1.
In model 2, we restrict our sample to reported earnings above last year’s earnings (∆Eit ≥ 0) and
find that the coefficient on CLUSTER_2 is not only significantly positive but also higher than the
model 1 estimate. This means managers tend to use positive discretionary accruals to report
income increase to give appearance of sustaining previous year’s earnings even when premanaged earnings fall short of the prior year’s level. In Model 3 and 4, we consider the intervals
49

AAFBJ | Volume 6, no. 1, 2012

[-0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04] surrounding zero. Both the coefficients on CLUSTER_3 and
CLUSTER_4 are significantly positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that when premanaged earnings are slightly below last year’s earnings, managers use income increasing
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to report small but positive earnings increase. From
Model 1 to Model 4, we find a consistent and positive association between discretionary accruals
when pre-managed earnings are below targets. This suggests that managers shift earnings from
losses or earnings decreases on a pre-managed basis to report ex post profits or earnings
increases.

Table 7
Pre-managed earnings change
Independent Variables

Expected sign

Intercept

?

CLUSTER_1 ( ∆PMEit <0)

+

CLUSTER_2 (∆PMEit < 0,
∆Eit ≥ 0)
CLUSTER_3
(−0.04≤∆PMEit<0)
CLUSTER_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEit
<0, 0≤ ∆Eit <0.04)
SIZE

+

−

GROWTH

+

ROA

?

WC

+

LEV

?

INDUSTRY EFFECTS
N
Adj. R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.0071
(0.55)
0.0612
(23.20)***

0.0697
(3.66)***

-0.0105
(-0.58)

-0.0056
(-0.50)

0.1004
(26.06)***

+

0.0189
(5.36)***

+
-0.0052
(-7.05)***
0.0000
(1.04)
0.0402
(7.03)***
0.0039
(1.09)
0.0167
(3.78)***
Yes
2388
0.1749

-0.0074
(-8.13)***
0.0000
(1.36)
0.0002
(0.03)
0.0131
(2.41)**
0.0408
(4.86)***
Yes
551
0.2997

-0.0036
(-3.54)***
0.0002
(2.82)**
0.0877
(7.9)***
-0.0029
(-0.44)
0.0023
(0.20)
Yes
527
0.1078

0.0354
(21.09)***
-0.0010
(-2.05)**
0.0002
(0.51)
0.0243
(2.68)***
-0.0130
(-2.42)**
-0.0008
(-0.13)
Yes
184
0.5845

Notes:
1). Variable definitions:

Adj(D
A)
CLUST
ER

=

Adjusted discretionary accruals scaled by total asset at year t-1, estimated from equation (2)

=

SIZE
GROW
T
ROA
WC
LEV
∑j INDj

=
=

An indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) is less than zero and zero otherwise. We test four regions for each of
earnings benchmarks, where 1) PMEit (∆PMEit ) < 0; 2) PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; Eit (∆Eit ) ≥ 0; 3) −0.04≤ PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; and 4) −0.04≤
PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; 0 ≤ Eit< 0.04. Pre-managed earnings level (PME) are defined as reported earnings (E) minus adjusted discretionary
accruals; pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME), calculated as reported earnings change (ΔE) minus adjusted discretionary accruals (see
Equation 3,4)
Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total assets at year t;
Growth opportunity for firm i for year t, measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1 divided by total assets at year t

=
=
=
=

Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i at year t
Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i in year t
Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t
1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS industrial codes and 0 otherwise

2). P-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
3). the estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) method.
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Further Tests
We perform a variety of additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings to measurement
errors associated with discretionary accruals.
The finding of the disappearance of the discontinuity around zero in the histogram
analysis could be argued as a statistical artefact because the construction of the pre-managed
earnings basically removes the variation from the Jones model. To test this, following the
method of Gore et al (2007) we generate a randomly determined ‘pseudo discretionary accruals’
for each firm-year observation. The sample of pseudo discretionary accruals has a normal
distribution with mean and standard deviation set equal to the sample distribution of Adj(DAit).
We then construct the pre-managed earnings as reported earnings minus the pseudo discretionary
accruals (rather than removing the Adj(DAit)) and recreate the histogram. The histogram shows
that simulated distribution of pre-managed earnings is fairly smooth around zero. Moreover, Zstatistics in the intervals immediately below and above zero are −0.62 and −1.10 (not reported),
which are insignificantly different from the expected frequencies. We also construct the premanaged earnings change as reported earnings changes minus the ‘pseudo discretionary accruals
change’. We obtain similar results in that the simulated distribution of pre-managed earnings
change is smooth. Therefore, without invoking Jones model, the simulation of discretionary
accruals through pseudo accruals illustrates how accrual manipulation contributes to a
discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings and earnings changes.
Second, the construction of pre-managed earnings is to essentially ‘back out’ or deduct
estimates of discretionary accruals from reported earnings. Error in estimating discretionary
accruals can lead to possible error in the estimation of pre-managed earnings. This in turn could
induce spurious association between accounting discretions and pre-managed earnings (Lim &
Lustgarten 2002). Following Barua et al. (2006), we use non-discretionary accruals to replace
discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are below or above targets to test for
accounting discretion. The intuition behind this procedure is that non-discretionary accruals are
not supposed to involve earnings management. However, if results are similar to that of
discretionary accruals, then the findings are likely to be a consequence of the backing-out error.
We redefine pre-managed earnings as net income before extraordinary items minus nondiscretionary accruals (PMEit=Eit−NDAit) and repeat all the tests. The regression results show
that CLUSTER_Nit are significantly negative in all the four models suggesting that our results
are not simply a consequence of the backing-out problem.
Finally, we use two smaller interval widths of 0.01 and 0.005 to assess whether the
discontinuity presented in the primary analysis is an artefact of a pre-determined interval. If the
interval width is too large or small, then the frequencies may not be sensitive to shifts in
proportions in them. Our tests from the adjustments of intervals are qualitatively similar to
earlier results in Tables 2 and 3, although with the finer interval we lose the power of our tests.
We also use operating cash flow as an instrumental variable to surrogate for pre-managed
earnings as operating cash flow is not related to discretionary accruals (Peasnell et al. 2005). For
the profit benchmark, the results remain qualitatively unchanged to those reported in the main
text.
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Conclusion
This study exploits the distributional properties of ex post earnings and links such properties with
ex ante pre-managed earnings to identify behaviour that is consistent with earnings management
practices to beat benchmarks. Using a sample period of 2000 to 2006, we find significant
discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings. These discontinuities disappear after the
removal of discretionary components of the earnings in its pre-managed earnings form. This
evidence is broadly supportive of prior research in Australian context.
We attempt to find the causality of spikes in reported earnings by examining whether
managers attempt to influence earnings in trying to meet implicit two earnings benchmarks:
avoiding losses (zero profit) and positive change in earnings. We find that when pre-managed
earnings are below zero or prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to exercise positive
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat both of these earnings benchmarks. We
document this through establishing links between frequencies of firms in various subsets of our
sample to these benchmarks and through our cluster-robust regressions.Our approach and
measure of pre managed earnings sheds useful insight into the ex ante conditions under which
firms seek to manipulate earnings. It also has implications for regulators to identify conditions
under which firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices.
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